17

Democracy and Prosperity¹

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17.1 The issue: has ethnic violence shown that Kenya is unsuited to electoral democracy?

Since 1991, Kenya has, at least nominally, been a multiparty democracy. The 2002 election ushered in genuine competition between parties and resulted in a peaceful change of government. The 2007 elections were expected to pass off equally smoothly but, in the event, the election triggered a serious outbreak of violence, largely ethnic. A post-election coalition government was formed only after the conciliating intervention of Kofi Annan. What are the likely economic implications of democracy in Kenya, and what are the lessons from the 2007 election? We draw upon some evidence from other developing countries and upon surveys of citizen attitudes conducted in Kenya just before and soon after the 2007 election.

Democracy is certainly compatible with good economic performance. Comparing democracies and autocracies over the period since 1970, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) find that, with the exception of countries richly endowed with natural resources, democracies on average grow significantly more rapidly than autocracies. One reason for this is that elections tend to discipline governments into adopting better economic policies. Chauvet and Collier (2009) analyse the effect of elections on policy in developing countries. They use a global sample covering three decades, and measure policy annually using both ratings made by the World Bank (the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) and those of the International Country Risk Guide. On both measures, they find that elections have cyclical and structural effects on policy. Cyclically, policies tend to deteriorate with the approach of an election, perhaps because governments are tempted into policies that deliver short-term benefits at the expense of costs that are only realized after the election. But these adverse cyclical effects are more than offset by a structural improvement that frequent elections bring to the average level of policies. This is certainly consistent with the improved economic performance in Kenya following the election of 2002. Not only did growth accelerate but, as we show below, most citizens recognized that policies had improved.

However, Chauvet and Collier find an important caveat to these benign results. Elections only improve policies if they are well conducted. Badly conducted elections have at best no significant effect on policy. Hence, from the perspective of the economy, the contested results
and the aftermath of the 2007 election may constitute a setback to what had until then appeared to be a beneficial process of democratization.

More fundamentally, the ethnic nature of much of the election-related violence potentially calls into question the viability of democracy in Kenya. If allegiance is based on ethnic identity, the normal beneficial consequences of elections may not hold: elections may fail to discipline governments into improved economic performance. Conversely, they may leave a dysfunctional legacy of violence and uncertainty.

Although prior to the era of democratic politics, ethnicity had been downplayed, in practice, it had been at the core of Kenyan politics, as evidenced by patterns of resource allocation and also cabinet and civil service appointments (Kimenyi and Shughart, 1989). The introduction of multiparty politics brought ethnic politics to the fore as opposition parties quickly splintered along, although not exclusively, ethnic groupings (Muigai, 1995; Kimenyi, 1997). As a result, the first multiparty election held in 1992 was a contest that largely rotated around ethnic alignments (Oyugi, 1997), a pattern that was repeated in the 1997 general elections. Both the 1992 and the 1997 elections were preceded by ethnic clashes, especially in the Coast and Rift Valley provinces. These clashes subsided after the elections. In 2002, a coalition of parties under the banner of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) defeated KANU in the presidential elections in what was a relatively peaceful election. Nevertheless, the ruling coalition splintered after only three years following disagreements over proposed constitutional reform.

Following the disputed 2007 election, violence spread to areas that hitherto had not experienced election-related violence, such as the city of Kisumu. Most of the violence and displacements occurred in the Rift Valley, much as in 1992 and 1997 (Apollos, 2001). Other affected areas included the cities of Nairobi (especially in the slums) and Mombassa. To a large extent, the violence was between members of different ethnic groups. In the cities, violence was primarily, but not exclusively, between the Kikuyus and the Luos, the two groups that had produced the leading presidential contenders (Kibaki and Odinga). In the Rift Valley, the violence involved members of the larger Kalejin ethnic groups and those considered migrants to the Rift Valley. Also affected were communities bordering the Rift Valley in Western and Nyanza provinces. Violence in Kisumu does not appear to have been directed to any specific group, was generally more of a protest against the election result, and took the character of looting and destruction of businesses and government property.²

These cycles of ethnic violence around election periods appear to support the views expressed by the first generation of independent African leaders, who argued that Africa was best suited to single-party systems of governance because multipartyism would result in increased ethnic
fractionalization with adverse consequences such as exacerbating conflicts and tribalism. Thus, for the most part, recent post-election violence appears to be largely ethnic and, as in past episodes, seems to give credence to the conventional wisdom that electoral choices in Africa are primarily driven by ethnicity.

Our survey data can help to inform these fundamental questions. They show to what extent political preferences in Kenya are defined by ethnicity.

17.2 Voter attitudes in the 2007 elections

The discussion that follows is based on two nationally representative surveys that were conducted before and after the 2007 Kenyan elections. The first survey was conducted just two weeks ahead of the General Election of 27 December 2007 and focused on voter intentions, attitudes towards violence, and the socio-economic characteristics of Kenyans. The sample includes 1,207 Kenyans aged 18 years and over from all eight provinces, and covering 76 out of 210 electoral constituencies. The sample captures the rural/urban split consistent with the most recent Kenyan census, which shows that 65 per cent of respondents live in rural areas and the remainder in urban areas. The ethnic distribution of the sample respondents also matches that of the national population. Whenever possible, interviews were conducted in the respondents’ mother tongue. In total, interviews were conducted in ten of the most widely spoken languages in Kenya. The second survey, conducted in August 2008, revisited previous respondents to find out about their experiences in the aftermath of the election, their expectations from the new coalition government, and whether their views had changed regarding trust among Kenyans, democracy, land conflict, and decentralization, among other issues. As the surveys were conducted immediately before the elections and some time after the formation of the coalition government, they provide a good picture of the factors that influenced voting intentions and how economic/political perceptions changed in the aftermath of the elections.

17.2.1 Voting and ethnic identity

According to the pre-election survey, most respondents (96 per cent) claimed they would cast their vote in the presidential elections. The voting intentions were divided, showing a virtual statistical tie between the leading candidates, Kibaki and Odinga. The headline numbers show an electorate clearly divided along ethnic lines. The three main presidential candidates, Kibaki (of Kikuyu origin), Odinga (of Luo origin), and Kalonzo (of Kamba origin), were overwhelmingly supported by the people from their own ethnic group.
Are Kenyans primarily identity voters, and what else appears to motivate their voting behaviour? We asked respondents why they intended to vote as they did. Evidently, the answers to such a question need to be discounted: in all such surveys, people are inclined to give answers that put them in a good light with the interviewer. With this important caveat, the self-described motivations are shown in Figure 17.1.

Figure 17.1. Self-Described Voting Motivations

As the results show, over 90 per cent of the respondents stated that they would select a candidate based on the candidate’s track record in terms of honesty, experience in handling funds, and care for the community. Less than 1 per cent of survey respondents stated that the ethnicity/tribe of the candidate was the most important factor in shaping their voting motivations. The denial of ethnicity as an influence lacks credibility in view of the fact that the three main presidential candidates were overwhelmingly supported by the people from their own ethnic groups (as shown in Figure 17.2). Indeed, even those ethnic groups that did not have a major presidential candidate voted as ethnic bloc votes: the Luhyas and Kalenjins primarily supported Odinga, whereas the Merus and Embus supported Kibaki.
The contrasting evidence in our survey between voting intentions by ethnicity and the self-described voting motivations suggests either that preferences over policy vary massively between ethnic groups, or that people are embarrassed by the reality of ethnic voting. The latter might arise if, at bottom, people do not trust those from other ethnic groups. Lack of trust might motivate voters to select a candidate from their own ethnic group over an otherwise better quality candidate from another group. People might expect those from other groups to vote along ethnic lines, and feel that unless they also vote ethnically they will be at a disadvantage. The belief that others would vote on the basis of ethnicity could be reinforced by the fact that much of the political campaigning played on ethnic sensitivities and loyalties.

One of the survey questions sought to investigate the expressed trust for members of other ethnic groups. As Table 1 shows, Kenyans mistrust members of other ethnic groups, a phenomenon particularly strong among those of Kikuyu and Luo origin. For these two groups, up to 60 per cent of the respondents trust those from other groups either ‘not at all’ or ‘only a little’.

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### Table 17.1 Ethnicity and trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent’s ethnic group</th>
<th>How much do you trust Kenyans from other ethnic groups?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhyia</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalejin</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17.2.2 Voting and perceptions of policy performance

Recall that, in a well-functioning democracy, voters succeed in disciplining government to improve economic policy. Voter assessments of the economic performance of the government are therefore particularly pertinent. Ideally, those who judge that the government has performed well would mostly vote for it, whereas those who judge that it has performed badly would vote against it. The survey finds that the performance of the Kibaki administration was judged favourably by most respondents, with 60 per cent of respondents perceiving that economic conditions were better than during the previous regime, as against only 25 per cent who perceived it to be worse. There was indeed a large difference in the voting intentions of people with these contrasting assessments: those with favourable assessments were much more likely to vote for the government (Figure 17.3).

![Figure 17.3. Voting Intentions Kibaki’s Approval Rating](image-url)
The match becomes even stronger when the question is changed from an overall assessment to a personal judgement of how the respondent’s own economic situation has changed (Figure 17.4). Some 29 per cent perceived that their own living conditions were better during Kibaki’s rule, 26 per cent thought them unchanged, and 45 per cent thought that their living conditions had worsened. These opinions mapped fairly closely into voting intentions.

Figure 17.4. Voting Intentions by how People’s Perceive their Living Conditions

![Figure 17.4](image)

However, the encouraging correspondence between assessments of the economy (whether overall or the consequences for the individual) and voting preferences results not from ethnicity being dominated by judgement of the economy, but because judgement of the economy is dominated by ethnicity (see Figure 17.5). Further, even where assessments of economic performance ran counter to ethnic identity, this did not substantially weaken the grip of ethnicity on voting. Among those Kikuyu voters who judged economic performance to have worsened during the Kibaki government, a large majority (88 per cent) still supported Kibaki. Conversely, among those Luo voters who judged economic performance to have improved during the Kibaki government, only a tiny minority (5 per cent) supported Kibaki.
During the election campaigns, the opposition candidates raised issues of ethnic favouritism and discrimination by the incumbent government. One question asked about respondents’ perceptions of how their ethnic group was treated by the government relative to other ethnic groups. Table 17.2 reports the summary of the responses by ethnicity. Whereas only 3 per cent of Kikuyus felt that their group was treated worse or much worse than others, 42 per cent of Luos felt so. Likewise, although over 20 per cent of Kikuyus considered that their group was treated better than other groups, only 4 per cent of Luos did so. Irrespective of the reality, the government was widely perceived as favouring its own group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent’s ethnic group</th>
<th>Is your group’s treatment by government, worse, the same, or better</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Much worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Kamba</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kalejin</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mijikenda</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
17.2.3 Voting and decentralization

In addition to Kibaki’s record, the future governance structure of the country was another major issue that divided Kenyans ahead of the election. In particular, the electorate was deeply divided on how the constitution should be reformed and whether to adopt a Majimbo system (a federal type of arrangement). The pre-election survey reveals a strong correlation between how people voted in the 2005 referendum on the issue and people’s intention to vote in the 2007 presidential elections. Among those who supported the referendum, a large majority (83 per cent) intended to vote for Kibaki. In contrast, 82 per cent of those who voted against the draft constitution stated that they would vote for Odinga or Kalonzo (Figure 17.6).

Figure 17.6. Voting Intentions by How People Voted in 2005 Referendum

![Bar chart showing voting intentions by referendum vote](chart.png)

The pre-election survey also reveals that there was some confusion among voters as to what Majimbo actually means. Among those who intended to vote for Odinga, the majority (75 per cent) understood Majimbo as a policy whereby regions would take control of their own resources. In contrast, among those who supported Kibaki, only 18 per cent defined it in this way. A further 16 per cent believed that Majimbo meant that each tribe would have its own government, whereas fully 37 per cent thought that Majimbo would expropriate the land of those people living outside their homeland and force them to return to where they came from. In other words, Kibaki supporters tended to see the issue directly in ethnic terms.

17.2.4 Ethnic voting by generation and income

Although ethnic identity was clearly predominant in shaping voting intentions, the power of ethnicity varied somewhat according to age. The voting intentions of the young were driven to a lesser extent by their ethnicity than those of the older generations. Similarly, ethnicity played a
more important role in shaping voting intentions among the higher income groups than among the poor. In other words, the older and wealthier Kenyans are, the more likely it is that their voting intentions are shaped along ethnic lines. Over time, the two effects may be working in opposite directions. Unless younger voters acquire stronger ethnic allegiances as they age, generational change will tend to weaken voting according to ethnic identity; but unless the effect of economic success changes, economic growth may accentuate identity voting.

17.3 The impact of the 2007 elections

Since the 2007 elections ended in dispute that culminated in widespread violence, they may actually have weakened political institutions. We now turn to perceptions of this issue.

17.3.1 Extent and causes of violence

The data show that there was widespread violence before and after the election. Electoral violence was reported in 80 per cent of the surveyed constituencies. Roughly 50 per cent of respondents were afraid that electoral violence would spread into their constituency before the election, and this figure went up to 58 per cent after the election. Roughly 30 per cent of respondents claimed that politicians in their areas had been openly advocating violence before the election. These figures remained practically unchanged after the election. Twenty eight per cent of respondents report a specific personal impact after the election, whether through personal injury, being displaced from home, destruction of property, loss of employment or earnings, or having friends or relatives who died in the violence.

Many respondents (43 per cent) blamed election irregularities and a weak electoral commission as triggers for the electoral violence. Presumably, the violence erupted through a combination of the trigger event and more structural causes of division. However, only 10 per cent of respondents believe that electoral violence was due to tribal conflict.

17.3.2 Long-term consequences of violence

The post-election survey gives an indication of the legacy that violence has left. The outbreaks of violence significantly contributed to the deterioration of trust and of confidence in the rule of law. One in four Kenyans judged that violence is justified. Those who were affected by violence were 20 per cent more likely to favour actions outside the law and 40 per cent more likely to resort to violence. People were evenly divided on whether amnesty should be given to those who were involved in the outbreaks of violence, with victims of violence being less likely to support amnesty.
17.3.3 Democracy and elections

The events that followed the disputed general election of 2007 do not appear to have reduced support for democracy. As prior to the election, around 70 per cent of respondents viewed democracy as the most preferable type of government. However, the perception that Kenya is a full democracy has changed. In December 2007, 20 per cent of respondents described Kenya as a fully democratic country. By August 2008, the proportion had dropped to only 6 per cent. There was a sharp increase, from 10 to 30 per cent, in the proportion preferring some method other than an election for choosing leaders. Presumably related to the decline of faith in elections, the Kenyan Electoral Commission (ECK) suffered a severe loss of credibility, this being regardless of which candidate the respondent had supported for president. The president also suffered a decline in trust, both among those who had voted for him and among the supporters of the main opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). However, some political institutions were actually trusted more as a result of the election: trust in parliament increased by 10 percentage points. Indeed, overall, Kenyans still had a high regard for their institutions. For instance, the majority of people (70 per cent) trusted the president, the vice-president, the prime minister, the parliament, and the coalition government either ‘a lot’ or ‘to some extent’.

17.3.4 Trust among individuals

Although the decline in trust in institutions was thus patchy, a more damaging legacy was the impact on trust between ordinary Kenyans of different ethnic groups. Even prior to the election, intergroup trust was rather limited, so that the decline resulting from the election left the society with disturbingly limited interethnic confidence. It is well established that trust enhances the scope for economic transactions. Hence, a loss of trust can be expected to have detrimental economic effects. Consistent with this expectation, a third of respondents claim that, since the elections, they do less business with people from other ethnic groups.

17.3.5 What identity do people give themselves?

The strength of ethnic identity evidently played an important part in voting. Potentially, the potency of ethnic identity can be weakened by strong national identity. Other ‘sub-national’ identities defined in terms of ethnicity, religion or economic-class are, of course, compatible with a national identity, but arguably if the national identity dominates, it is easier for democratic politics to function well. People would be more likely to place the good of the nation ahead of the good of their own ethnic group. Hence, the relative importance of the two sources of identity is of potential significance.
In both pre- and post-election surveys, the respondents were asked: 'We have spoken to many Kenyans and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, race, religion, or gender, and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being Kenyan, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?'

In December 2007, a few respondents (20 per cent) answered that they identify in terms of their ethnicity, and 37 per cent of respondents insisted on identifying themselves first and foremost in nationalistic terms, that is as Kenyans. Most others (43 per cent) identified themselves on neither basis, choosing instead occupation (18 per cent), social class (7 per cent), gender (4 per cent), or religion (3 per cent).

The survey conducted in August 2008 shows that, far from having undermined national identity, the violence had strengthened it. The proportion identifying first and foremost as Kenyans increased from 37 per cent to 47 per cent (a statistically significant increase). Perhaps many Kenyans learnt from the brief episode of violence that national unity was more important than they had realized.

17.3.6 Expectations from the coalition government

The great majority of Kenyans (70 per cent) were hopeful of the coalition government. For instance, most people (regardless of whom they claimed to have voted for) thought that the coalition government would perform the same, or better, than the past administration of President Kibaki in terms of reforming the constitution, distributing resources, solving land conflicts, and tackling government corruption. Sixty per cent of respondents thought that both national and their personal economic conditions would be the same or better than under the previous government.

17.3.7 Tribalism/ethnic violence in the future?

Opinions were divided as to whether the coalition government would combat tribalism in politics better than the previous Kibaki administration. On average, 43 per cent believed that tribalism in politics would be worse than under the previous administration, against 33 per cent who thought that it would be reduced. Perceptions differed widely across ethnic groups. Those groups that felt they had suffered discrimination during the previous administration, notably the Luos and Luhyas, expected tribalism to be reduced. In contrast, the Kikuyus expected it to get worse.
17.4 A tentative assessment

The survey revealed a degree of confidence in Kenyan democracy on the part of ordinary citizens. Nor is this confidence necessarily misplaced: as we have noted, as long as elections are properly conducted, they do succeed in disciplining governments into improved economic policies.

However, the events that followed the general election of 2007 revealed prior weaknesses and have left a difficult legacy.

The key weakness concerns interethnic trust, which even prior to the election was very limited. A realistic approach to the lack of trust is to build robust supervisory institutions in which all citizens can have confidence. A key such institution is the electoral commission. A potential model is Ghana, where the commission is structurally independent of candidates and has built considerable credibility with citizens.

One legacy of the violence is a collapse in interethnic trust from already low levels. However, a more encouraging legacy is a surprising strengthening in national, as opposed to ethnic, identity. Perhaps many Kenyans ‘looked over the brink’ and did not like what they saw might happen if identity conflicts continued unabated. This response is potentially important for fundamental political choices. International experience suggests that two quite different models of society could be appropriate for social peace. These models can be referred as the ‘hotel’ and ‘building a house together’.

The hotel model is where people can do what they like as long as they do not disturb the other guests and they pay their bills. That is the Rawlsian liberal model. In this case, politics is not run by a vision of the common good. All politicians should do is to offer the best public services for the least cost in taxation. This vision is economically efficient, but with the problem that it does not generate loyalties or a sense of belonging. It does not develop a national identity, a sense of common good or social solidarity. Examples of this type of model are Switzerland and Canada. Like Canada, Switzerland is a rich paradise, yet what many people do not realize is that it is actually composed of three very distinct ethno-linguistic groups: German, Italian, and French. At the risk of offending Swiss sensibilities, it often appears to outsiders that the main thing that these groups really agree on is that they do not trust each other. The Swiss designed their public sector to take into account this lack of trust across the ethno-linguistic groups. In this type of model, the solution is to shape the public sector to achieve ethnic equity. For instance, the Swiss public sector has quotas and a rotation of jobs, which are based strictly on each group’s proportion in the population. Under the Swiss model, therefore, the allocation of posts cannot
favour a particular ethnic group. So if Kenya is to live with the current ethnic identities and lack of trust across ethnic groups, then the adoption of the Swiss model could help to facilitate the achievement of peaceful co-existence and prosperity. This could be done by redesigning the public sector and by implementing policies that promote ethnic equity.

The second model is not understood as a hotel. Instead, society is understood as a home that we build together. It is the home where we belong. It is a shared project. It is a society where the different subcommunities can strive and pursue a collective good. In this model, all share the responsibility of building the nation. Each person and family has the responsibility of pursuing the well-being of the nation. This task should be enhanced by the institutions, government public discourse and actions, placing the common goal of the nation above anything else.

An example of this second model is Tanzania. If we compare the policies pursued by Tanzania and Kenya right after their independence, in terms of economic policies, Tanzania’s President Nyerere made serious mistakes. For instance, Nyerere’s economic policy of ‘ujama’, community-based farming collectives, proved disastrous. If we remember when the Tanzanians accused Kenyans of being of a ‘money man’ society, Kenyans laughed back and said Tanzanians are a ‘money nothing’ society. However, in political terms, Nyerere got things right. He emphasized the sense of a national identity over ‘sub-national’ identities. He was very careful in how the education system was run. The public school curriculum was designed to stress common Tanzanian history, culture, and values, and inculcate a strong sense of national identity (Court, 1984). Nyerere also employed Kiswahili as a nation-building tool. After independence, Tanzania established Kiswahili as the national language, and its use was quickly transferred to government administration and all spheres of public life (Polome, 1980). A keystone in Tanzanian policies to build a sense of national unity has been the focus on an equitable regional distribution of public investment in education, health, and infrastructure (Court and Kinyanjui, 1980).

To date, Kenya has pursued neither of the above models. The state lacks the powerful independent checks-and-balances that the hotel model requires to ensure ethnic balance. In this model, although people do not trust each other, it does not matter because they trust the institutions. But nor has it pursued the other model. Kenya has not used the school curriculum to promote a coherent national identity. For instance, the school curriculum does not study Kenya as a nation until grade 5. The Kenyan focus on provincial geography and history in grades 1–4 perhaps deepens ethnic divisions, especially among the many who drop out of primary school before grade 5 (Miguel, 2004). Although Kiswahili has long been widely spoken in Kenya as a ‘lingua franca’, it competes with other languages such as English and local languages in political forums and schools. On top of that, the regional distribution of central government resources has
favoured some groups, greatly politicizing ethnicity (Court and Kinyanjui, 1980). Our surveys show that Kenyans are not opposed to resources being equally shared across regions, but they do oppose policies such as Majimbo that have been used to mobilize partisans.

The evidence presented in this chapter confirms the finding by Miguel (2004), who compares similar areas in Kenya and Tanzania (Busia and Meatu) located near each other on opposite sides of Lake Victoria, which were similar along key dimensions in the 1960s when Tanzania gained independence and adopted its nation-building programme. Miguel finds that Tanzania has had more effective interethnic cooperation and higher public good funding than Kenya. These are the contrasting legacies of 45 years of discourses of national unification from the top in Tanzania and of ethnic differentiation in Kenya.

Both the Swiss–Canadian ‘hotel’ model of the state and the Tanzanian model of building a common national identity look to offer viable routes to a peaceful and prosperous democracy. But the past Kenyan model of ethnic politics without the support of trusted institutions may expose the society to the risk of further violence without disciplining governments sufficiently into good economic performance.

Notes

1. The CSAE surveys presented in this chapter were funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) as part of the Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (iiG), a research consortium aimed at studying how to improve institutions in Africa and South Asia. The views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID.

2. Nevertheless, non-Luo business owners in Kisumu were targeted, and most are reported to have left the area.

3. A common explanation for the 1992 and 1997 violence is that it was meant to weaken the voting strength of the opposition, especially in the Rift Valley. This idea is supported by the fact that such conflicts subsided after the elections (see Kimenyi and Ndung’u, 2005). Of note, however, is that, in the 1992 and 1997 general elections, most of the conflicts were before the elections, and furthermore there was no notable violence during the 2002 elections.

4. In piloting and fieldwork, we found that the vast majority of Kenyans were welcoming and eager to talk freely about their voting intentions. The survey reached a response rate of 80 per cent, a high rate for studies of this kind in Kenya.

5. Nonetheless, it is important to note that we cannot infer from these responses which specific ethnic groups they mistrust.
References


